approach gives an inadequate justification of bias crimes and cannot explain the state's egalitarian duty to protect the most vulnerable victims.
The proposition is tempting because the egalitarian goals are worthy. Bias crime legislation is indeed justifiable on retributivist grounds, and the interests of crime victims indeed deserve great attention, by retributivists as well as utilitarians. But, I will argue, the suggestion is largely unnecessary and potentially dangerous. It is largely unnecessary because the authors understate the ability of the retributive paradigm to encompass egalitarian concerns, including the protection of especially vulnerable victims. Yet it is potentially dangerous. Insofar as a particular form of egalitarianism does permit, or even requires, that the defendant's blameworthiness be ignored, that egalitarian demand is in conflict with retributive values. To be sure, the state has a duty to promote egalitarian goals, and has many legitimate means for doing so. But sometimes we must decline to pursue these goals through the instrument of criminal law, if we care about giving offenders their just deserts.
I.
Summary of the Harel/Parchomovksy argument
The authors correctly observe that contemporary criminal law discourse embodies a "wrongfulness-culpability hypothesis" (hereinafter WC).
3
Under WC, criminal sanctions require that a defendant has culpably brought about a wrong; and increased sanctions are warranted, ceteris paribus, only if the defendant has acted more culpably, or has brought about a greater wrong. These features of WC, they note, are consistent with retributivist and other non-utilitarian approaches to 3 Id. at 508.
punishment. 4 But WC is deficient, the authors assert, and must be supplemented by a "fair protection" paradigm (FPP). 5 WC is deficient because it gives no independent weight to the interests of a victim. In particular, WC ignores the special vulnerability of certain victims. Consider (this is my example)
the elderly. Suppose we conclude that they are especially likely to be crime victims (they are "high-risk" in the authors' terms), or that they are likely to suffer especially severe harm if they are the victims of a crime like assault (they are "extra-sensitive"). 6 WC cannot justify imposing a more serious penalty on a person who attacks an elderly victim. For "no particular offender is responsible for the fact that the victim was particularly susceptible to crime due to the disposition of other criminals to prey on her." 7 However, if WC is supplemented by FPP, then (the authors argue) a greater sanction for such an attacker can indeed be justified-by the victim's greater need for protection. FPP expresses the egalitarian notion that protection from crime is a good produced by the criminal law, and the state has a duty to distribute this good fairly. Specifically, the state should make special efforts to reduce crime against those who are especially vulnerable due to immutable personal characteristics.
8 Greater 4 Id. at 508 (" [WC] dominates the non-utilitarian discourse of criminal law"); 520 (" [WC] cannot accommodate utilitarian theories of punishment."). 5 Id. at 509.
enforcement of the criminal law against those who victimize the most vulnerable citizens is one way for the state to discharge this duty. But when this is not feasible, the state should impose harsher sanctions.
In the course of this argument, the authors offer some provocative criticisms of WC, and also provide an interesting taxonomy of the types of vulnerability that they believe the state should address and the types it should not. 9 But I believe that the argument as a whole is unpersuasive.
Before I provide a general criticism, it will be helpful to consider whether the argument achieves the narrower goal of providing an attractive justification of bias crimes. Even in this narrower context, I believe, the argument fails.
II.
Internal critique: Does FPP justify bias crime legislation?
The authors claim that the usual rationales within WC theory cannot justify bias crimes, and I respond to that claim later in this essay. But this is not the most original part of their argument. 10 Rather, the authors' most who are the most vulnerable to crime. The purely egalitarian approach to general vulnerability is obviously problematic. Should the state take steps to prevent the wealthy from providing themselves a degree of security that the state cannot afford to provide the rest of society? Should it provide lower penalties than would otherwise be justified whenever the victim is a wealthy person who is relatively invulnerable to crime?
On the other hand, a purely egalitarian approach to vulnerability is much more plausible in the narrower context of racially-based violence. That is, even if certain racial groups are much more at risk from such violence than others, we might choose not to give priority to their needs. Rather, a neutral bias crime statute that imposes the same punishment supplement for crimes against any group expresses the egalitarian value that racial bias is socially divisive and especially culpable. 9 See "On Hate and Equality," at 524-529, 535-536. interesting assertion is that FPP is an especially promising rationale for bias crime legislation. In their view, such legislation responds to the fact that racial and other groups protected by such legislation are unusually vulnerable to crime. To compensate for that extra vulnerability, we need to impose a stronger sanction against those who select persons to be victims based on racial criteria and similar immutable characteristics.
The argument that FPP justifies higher sanctions for bias crimes has some initial plausibility. The authors are correct to point out that bias crimes often do contribute to the special vulnerability of the group members subject to bias. Obviously, other things being equal, if crimes committed on the basis of race suddenly ceased to occur, members of such victimized racial groups would be less vulnerable to crime.
But bias crime enhancement is not principally designed to compensate for this extra vulnerability. If it were, one would expect to see relatively widespread enactment of similar penalty enhancement laws for other vulnerable groups-the elderly, children, prison inmates, the hospitalized, the mentally ill, and so forth. No such widespread pattern exists. 11 Moreover, many of these other groups are much more vulnerable (1999) Mich. L. Rev. 1857 Rev. (1999 . 11 To be sure, special duties are often imposed in some of these situations. In many jurisdictions, for example, lack of consent to rape is conclusively presumed (or is deemed morally irrelevant) for certain classes of vulnerable victims, including children and those with mental disabilities. But this type of example is better understood as expressing a uniform criterion of criminal liability for a particular offense (i.e., requiring mature, knowing consent) than as evidencing an independent concern with general vulnerability to crime.
Criminal laws prohibiting the abuse of children, and heightened penalties for committing crimes against children, do show a genuine concern with vulnerability, at least in the "extrasensitive" sense. Of course, it is also quite plausible to conclude that the to crime (in either the "high-risk" or "extrasensitive" sense, or both) than are the racial and other groups usually covered by bias crime legislation.
Furthermore, the additional vulnerability to crime due to bias crimes surely pales in comparison with additional vulnerability to crime due to geography, wealth, class, and similar factors. Moving away from a violent inner city neighborhood will reduce vulnerability to crime far more than changing the color of one's skin will. 12 Indeed, if unequal vulnerability to crime is the overriding social problem that the authors suggest, the best and most direct governmental response would involve the following process: carefully collect statistical data about the incidence of crime on various groups; determine which factors (age, physical and mental health, poverty, urban versus nonurban location, large versus small city, gender, race, and so forth) have what degree of independent statistical significance; and then prioritize efforts (via higher sanctions or greater enforcement) to diminish vulnerability according to the relative significance of these factors. Whatever the merits of this approach, it is not the approach we see in contemporary substantive criminal law and criminal enforcement policies.
Even if unusual vulnerability really were the problem that bias crime legislation addresses, wouldn't it make more sense to police, investigate, and prosecute crimes committed against bias crime victims more aggressively than to increase the sanctions for such crimes? The authors agree that either increased sanctions or increased enforcement might be an effective response to the unequal vulnerability of different victims, but long-term emotional harms to a child from a given physical attack are considerably greater than the harms from a similar attack on an adult. 12 The authors at least partially concede this point, "On Hate and Equality," at 538, but argue that we should still address the racial component of vulnerability separately.
However, if the additional vulnerability due to race and other criteria encompassed by bias crime laws is insignificant relative to other forms of vulnerability that criminal law does not address, then FPP is not a persuasive explanation for bias crime legislation.
they suggest that increased enforcement is not likely to be an effective strategy for bias crime victims, because "it is only after the perpetrator of the crime is detected that one can discern her motives clearly."
13 By contrast, they point out, special vulnerability due to poverty can more effectively be addressed through ex ante efforts (such as policing of poor neighborhoods) than through ex post higher sanctions.
But the greater ability to detect bias motivation ex post does not conclusively support employing increased sanctions rather than more aggressive prosecution. Post-crime investigation and prosecution of bias crimes could still be pursued more aggressively. 14 In some situations, police can reliably predict a significant chance of interracial hostility-for example, in certain neighborhoods, in connection with sporting events when teams are primarily of different races, or following a racially charged trial, the killing of a prominent minority leader, or the killing of an apparently innocent minority group member by police. 15 Suppose that studies indicate that a significant proportion of assaults committed by blacks on whites, or by whites on blacks, involve discriminatory selection. For purposes of FPP, it might actually be more efficient for police and prosecutors to aggressively give higher priority to all interracial crimes than to impose a higher sanction in those few cases where discriminatory selection could be proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. (Also, the extent to which a higher sanction will deter defendants is itself unclear, inasmuch as unconscious motives may play a role.) additional moral condemnation is warranted; but the quantum of additional condemnation that is deserved is not a direct function of the protected group's unusual vulnerability to crime. Race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation are personal traits with enormous social significance. Criminal actors who select victims on these bases do not act in a historical and social vacuum. The moral and social significance of their acts is informed by, and partly a function of, centuries of official and private acts of discrimination that have disadvantaged groups along these lines.
Contemporary bias crimes reinforce the memories and effects of that discrimination, and threaten social division. When the authors suggest that the fundamental reason for imposing higher sanctions against those who commit crimes out of bias is differential vulnerability, they offer a rationale that would equally justify imposing higher sanctions against those who victimize the emotionally sensitive, the gullible, or the physically weak. In so doing, the authors ignore the compelling social context of bias crimes.
III. Retributivism and FPP
To answer the broader claim that retributivism is a deficient theory of punishment, it is critical to examine more carefully the retributive perspective underlying WC. We will see that the authors greatly underestimate the capacity of retributivism to accommodate both egalitarian norms and norms protecting vulnerable victims. At the same time, they are correct that that capacity is not unlimited. However, I will argue that the limits which retributivism does place upon the incorporation of broad egalitarian goals within criminal law are a virtue, not a vice.
Criminal law is a distinctive legal institution. When the state imposes criminal sanctions, it deprives the offender of property or liberty, and it accompanies that deprivation with a solemn moral condemnation.
The state must have a powerful justification for these practices. Consider an example. A criminal prohibition of lynching would, in the American historical context, clearly be designed to address raciallymotivated brutality that also constitutes an interference with the judicial process. Such a prohibition could reflect either or both interpretations of equality.
On a purely consequentialist interpretation, it reflects a legislative intention to prevent future lynchings and thus to prevent both serious individual harms and the perpetuation of racial prejudice and racial division. On a purely retributive interpretation, punishment is not justified by, nor calibrated to, its expected efficacy in preventing future lynchings.
Rather, without regard to such effects or to the relative efficacy of other social controls in preventing lynchings, a retributivist can justify especially harsh punishment of such an offender because he has made a highly culpable and wrongful choice to seriously harm the victim, to interfere with the victim's equality rights, and to inflame racial tensions in the community.
20
The authors briefly mention the possibility that egalitarian norms could be part of WC. In their view, however, incorporating fair protection into WC "would radically transform the [WC] paradigm" and "would require an expansion of the concept of wrongfulness far beyond its traditional boundaries." 21 In the next sections, I will take issue with this view. We will see that WC can indeed accommodate egalitarian norms, including norms responding to the "fair protection" concerns that (according to the authors) only FPP can adequately address. Moreover, WC can also accommodate a distinctive concern about the special culpability and wrongfulness of 20 In this essay, for purposes of clarity, I consider only the implications of a pure retributive approach, not a "mixed" approach that includes both retributive and consequentialist components. 21 "On Hate and Equality," at 522.
harming the vulnerable, a concern that is not always grounded in egalitarian values.
B. Retributivism and culpability
Can a retributivist justify imposing a greater penalty on a criminal offender who preys on the vulnerable, based on the offender's greater culpability? Can retributivist culpability principles also incorporate egalitarian norms? In each case, yes. Holding constant the degree of wrongdoing, it is sometimes more culpable to take advantage of the vulnerable or to act on reasons that violate egalitarian norms.
With respect to vulnerability, consider an example from the law of homicide. In People v. Poplis, 22 defendant repeatedly beat a three year old child over a course of six days, resulting in the child's death. In deciding that the proof was sufficient to permit a conviction of "depraved indifference" murder, the court emphasized that the "continued brutality to a child" helped establish a "graver culpability" than would be displayed in a merely reckless killing.
23
It seems clear that the helplessness and vulnerability of the child are factors that the jury may legitimately consider in evaluating the defendant's culpability. 24 And a retributivist rationale, focusing on the offender's extraordinary callousness and malevolent character, can support this legal rule.
The authors do consider the view that "crime directed at high-risk victims is morally worse than crime directed at low-risk victims," because such a crime, by preying on one who lacks a fair opportunity to defend 22 30 N.Y. 2d 85, 281 N. E. 2d 167 (1972) .
23 Id. at 88. A reckless killing that did not demonstrate "depraved indifference" would be classified as manslaughter, not murder. 24 In the authors' terms, a child is both "high-risk"-she has special difficulty warding off an attack-and "extrasensitive"-she is more likely to suffer injury if attacked.
herself, violates the principle of fair play. "But," they reply, "this view is premised on an analogy between criminality and sportsmanship-a dubious analogy, at best."
25
Their brief analysis of the reasons why preying on the vulnerable is especially culpable is unconvincing. The appropriate question is not whether a victim has been offered a "fair chance" at self-defense-as if the offender owes, not just a primary duty not to commit a crime, but also a secondary duty to give the victim a "sporting chance" to fight back. 26 Rather, an actor's willingness to exploit vulnerability often reveals an especially heinous disregard for the humanity of others, as the criminal law recognizes.
27
Thus far, I have argued that one who exploits vulnerability in causing a harm or wrong can justifiably be considered more culpable than one who does not. This argument does not essentially rely on any egalitarian norms. However, egalitarian concerns do underlie a principal argument in favor of bias crime legislation-that the special culpability of a prejudiced actor justifies a higher penalty, apart from whether the actor 25 Id. at 530-531. 26 Recall the comic book convention by which the villain who has captured the superhero inevitably gives his captive ample opportunity to make a courageous escape, a 36 Of course, insofar as random selection of victims is a more widespread social phenomenon, it can cause considerable public insecurity. In such a case, the insecurity is an additional harm and thus warrants a higher penalty because of the act's greater wrongfulness, not just its greater culpability. The recent spate of random shootings of drivers on California highways is an example.
One might object that "random" or "arbitrary" selection methods don't present equality problems at all, insofar as possible victims are selected by lottery, which is a kind of ex ante equality. Moreover, a coherent explanation of a killing based on the actor's relationship to the victim can sometimes at least partly mitigate punishment, while a randomly directed killing is much less likely to seem understandable. 37 Formally, bias crimes incorporate egalitarian norms as a mental state element of a crime, not as an actus reus element. To be guilty of a bias crime, one must act out of racial or other prohibited animus, or must select the victim on a prohibited basis. So it might seem that a retributivist justification of higher penalties for bias crimes must turn on the heightened culpability of a bias criminal (as expressed in this additional mental state element), not on his committing a more wrongful act or bringing about a greater harm.
But this formal focus is too narrow. It is legitimate to base an ultimate justification of bias crimes on the greater wrongdoing or harm that such crimes express or bring about (as measured by actual affront to egalitarian values), rather than on their greater culpability (as measured by the actor's attitude towards, or choice to bring about, that effect), even though as a formal matter, the state need not prove in any individual case that the crime implicated additional individual or social harms.
For a helpful discussion of the distinction between wrongfulness and culpability, and an acknowledgement that the distinction is not precisely coextensive with the criminal law distinction between actus reus and mens rea, see Dillof, supra note 16=, at 1024-1036.
harms, emotional harms, harms to the legal system, harms to national security, and myriad other harms or wrongs can also be included.
38
In many instances, the criminal "wrong" consists entirely in the violation of an egalitarian norm-for example, intentional interference with voting rights on the basis of race, or willful violation of laws against discrimination in employment, housing, or public accommodation. In the context of bias crimes, when prejudice or racial animosity lies behind a crime, the crime can cause additional harm both to the victim and to others, including the wider society.
The authors downplay the harm that prejudice causes to the victim, asserting that the only real harm is the physical or other injury caused by the crime. Discriminatory treatment, they claim, "does not exacerbate the wrong committed by the perpetrator." 39 Moreover, to conclude otherwise, they believe, is to give the victim a "protectable interest in the perpetrator's thoughts." 40 But the claim that the harm from discrimination is exhausted by the harm that nondiscriminatory treatment would produce is quite implausible. Presumably their reason for supporting FPP in the first place is to endorse the equality rights of victims. The additional harm that violation of such equality rights adds to the criminal act might be less 38 To be sure, some retributive theories will not be so pluralistic, and will be more restrictive in what may count as a "wrong." However, the authors' argument is more general, so I think I am being fair in treating them as concluding that no retributive account can accommodate FPP.
Interestingly enough, the authors note that to employ their own criterion of "vulnerability" in applying FPP, they must identify the "magnitude of the harm," and they concede that this "is often a vague concept. The harm may involve a violation of the dignitary interests of the victim or the violation of her autonomy, and any evaluation of the magnitude of these harms is inevitably controversial." Id. at 527. 39 Id. at 515.
40 Id. at 516, relying on Dillof, supra note 16=, at 1039-1040.
tangible, but that does not render it unreal.
41
Nor does this analysis presuppose that the victim has an "interest in the perpetrator's thoughts,"
any more than a race discrimination or sex discrimination victim in a noncriminal case is concerned with free-floating thoughts that the perpetrator does not act upon.
42
The authors are also skeptical that bias crimes cause any distinctive harm to the wider society. But their skepticism is a result of defining that harm in race-neutral terms (generalized harm to communities; precipitation of further violence), and then observing that bias crimes are not as distinctive as claimed in causing such harms.
These doubts are unwarranted once we notice that the distinctive features of bias crimes can exacerbate racial division in the wider society. Moreover, for evidence that the additional injury caused by bias includes significant emotional and psychological effects, as well as harms to the community, see Lawrence, supra note 10=, at 40-44. 42 Perhaps the authors believe that while FPP imposes a duty on the state to equalize protection, it does not imply any correlative equality right on the part of the victim.
Although this is a coherent position, it is a surprising one, in light of the authors' pervasive complaint that WC is seriously inadequate relative to FPP in the protection it affords to victims. This position also seems to have the troubling implication that civil antidiscrimination laws that give full-fledged enforceable rights to victims (including injunctive and damage remedies) are unjustifiable. 43 A similar blindness seems to underly their dubious explanation for why bias crime laws neutrally protect all races and religions. This feature of bias crimes is a puzzle for the authors and for their "vulnerability" explanation of such crimes, insofar as racial and religious majorities are much less vulnerable to crime than minorities are. See "On Hate and Equality," at 535-536. In explanation, they assert that racial prejudices are likely to change over time (by comparison, for example, with the explicit protection of the vulnerable under sentencing guidelines); thus, the neutral language protecting all groups "ensures that the group most in need of greater protection at any given time will actually receive it." Id. at 532. But a much more straightforward and plausible explanation for this symmetrical coverage is that a bias crime by a minority group member against a majority 46 To be sure, one could imagine a retributive theory with an extremely narrow criterion of wrongdoing, a criterion that defined harms and wrongs to human interests according to a simple, uniform standard (such as serious interference with physical functioning). But such a theory would be wildly inconsistent with any contemporary system of criminal law; it would embrace homicide and assault, perhaps, but could not even explain the harm of rape, not to mention serious non-physical harms, harms to property interests, nonindividuated harms to social interests, and the like. 47 For discussion of whether Sutton actually made the famous statement attributed to him, see: http://www.banking.com/aba/profile_0397.htm.
48
In the debate over whether the large differential in punishment for distributing crackcocaine versus powder-cocaine can be justified, it is certainly relevant (if true) that young assaulting a police officer can deserve a higher penalty than assaulting a private citizen, for the first type of assault undermines public respect for law and increases public fear and insecurity by reducing public protection against crime.)
With respect to both bank robbery and drug offenses, the seriousness of the harm depends not just on the amount of economic or physical harm that the offender personally causes in an individual case, but also on the acts of others-specifically, the risk that others will also find the crime an attractive option. Only an extremely cramped view of "wrongdoing" would ignore such factors. Offenders act in a social setting.
The significance of any particular criminal act depends in part on the acts of other offenders, other victims, and other persons. And the state is entitled to consider this broader significance in criminalizing and grading wrongs.
A good example of how retributive theory can take vulnerability into account is the crime of rape. Almost all rapes are committed against women. The threat of rape significantly contributes to the greater vulnerability that many women feel when they are alone in public spaces.
Accordingly, rape can legitimately be considered a more serious crime than an otherwise comparable attack on a person's physical safety and integrity. Concededly, this proposition is difficult to test, insofar as it very difficult to compare the severity of rape with the severity of other intentional physical harms and invasions with quite different objective people are significantly more likely to use or distribute crack cocaine. See U.S.
Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (1997) (supporting some differential, though not the 100-1 ratio in current law, based on such findings as these: crack cocaine is more often associated with violent street crime related to its marketing and distribution; it is more widely available on the street; and it is more affordable, and thus "is particularly appealing and accessible to the most vulnerable members of our society").
characteristics. Still, in principle, even if we believed that a rape was a somewhat less serious wrong than, say, an intentional wounding causing serious bodily injury, the egalitarian concern about women's vulnerability could justify punishing rape with a penalty as high or higher.
The authors appear to assume that WC cannot accommodate these broader concerns. Thus, they assert that WC can only accommodate reasons that are "intrinsic to the criminal encounter. should be proportional to "r x H," terms that essentially correspond to culpability and wrongfulness, respectively. In the course of explaining why H (or wrongfulness) should encompass both "wrongs" and "harms," Nozick defends both the view that injuring a more vulnerable person is a greater wrong, and the view that the degree of wrongfulness depends in part on role responsibilities:
Letting H correspond to the degree to which others are wronged, or to the wrongness of the act, rather than to the degree of harm, fits our view that (a) injuring helpless people or children who cannot resist and do not fully understand what is happening is worse than a similar injury to competent adults; (b) doing an act you have a special duty or responsibility not to do (for instance, a policeman necessity and self-defense, many retributivists insist on an absolute (agent-relative) duty not to intentionally cause the death of an innocent person, in opposition to (agent-neutral) utilitarian arguments that might rationalize an intentional killing if such a killing would promote a net savings of lives.
53
But can retributivism really accommodate, as an aspect of wrongdoing, the concern to protect the general public rather than just the individual victim? Or is this actually a disguised consequentialist view? who believes that he is practically certain to succeed more severely than a (reckless) killer who believes that his likelihood of success is much less.
One final observation is in order concerning the retributive significance of culpability and wrongfulness. I have analyzed these factors separately, but they sometimes operate synergistically. In the bias crime context in particular, certain types of wrongdoing are a function of culpability. Consider the harm of racial division, a harm invoked by proponents of criminalizing bias crimes. Normally only actors acting with a defined type of culpability-racial animus, or at least selection on the basis of race-will in fact cause this harm. For unless the community views the crime as racially biased, a crime committed by a white offender against a black victim (or vice versa) will not exacerbate racial tensions. sufficient social harm to warrant criminal punishment. Suppose the following context. In a particular city, most of the high schools are racially segregated, and almost every high school basketball game in the last several years has been followed by serious racially motivated violence.
Many of these fights have been precipitated by minor interracial assaults, including some assaults that clearly were motivated by anger at losing a game rather than racial animosity. In this volatile environment, the city passes an ordinance increasing the penalty for assault in any case in which the actor knowingly assaults a person of the opposite race.
Although it is a close question, I believe that such an enhancement is justifiable.
In all but such extraordinary circumstances, however, it is not legitimate to permit enhancement for a merely knowing victimization of a person of another race, even though it is legitimate to permit enhancement for a knowing victimization of a child or police officer (assuming in both cases that the victim's status is irrelevant to the decision to assault).
Moreover, this distinction underscores the inadequacy of the FPP approach, which cannot readily explain why the situations differ. If it really is true that the best justification for bias crime enhancement is the special vulnerability of the victim, then in both cases, knowingly harming a person in a vulnerable category should be sufficient culpability to warrant criminal punishment. But it is not. And that should cause us to doubt the premise. But the approaches sometimes diverge. First, although a wide variety of forms of "wrongdoing" can be encompassed within a retributive theory, in the end any such theory will include some forms of wrong and exclude others. Once the appropriate content of wrongdoing is specified, additional equality concerns may arise about whether, once the criminal law is actually enforced, the state provides equal protection to the class of victims of "wrongs" so defined. But these additional equality concerns about unequal vulnerability are indeed external to the retributive theory.
On a retributive theory, those additional, external equality concerns, unlike internal equality concerns encompassed within the criterion of "wrongdoing" itself, can only be addressed by prosecutorial practices, not by varying the legal sanction for the crime (as I explain more fully below). The authors actually acknowledge that visibility is a good reason for incorporating the egalitarian concerns of FPP into the substantive criminal law, rather than as sentencing guidelines. "On Hate and Equality," at 538 n. 78. 63 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.1(b) (1998). The authors assert that these guidelines could reflect either WC or FPP (in the sense that the vulnerable victim needs special protection because she cannot easily defend herself). "On Hate and Equality," at 530-531. But their assertion is undercut by this culpability requirement, a requirement that the authors do not discuss and that is better explained by WC than by FPP.
IV. Conclusion
An important theme throughout the authors' essay is the complaint that the retributivist/WC approach discounts the interests of the victim of crime. 64 Indeed, they complain that that approach "is heavily biased in favor of criminal offenders." 65 Insofar as this just amounts to the objection that retributivism cannot account for either egalitarian values or the problem of especially vulnerable victims, the objection is misplaced, for reasons I have explained. But if this amounts to the broader objection that any use of the criminal law that will be effective in protecting victims should be permissible, the objection confronts the bedrock retributive principle that adequate personal responsibility is a prerequisite to just criminal punishment. Strict liability, criminal punishment of children, and criminal punishment of the innocent are but a few members of the parade of horribles that retributivists can legitimately trot out in response to the objection.
64 See e.g. id. at 508 ("The [WC] paradigm assigns no independent importance to the crime victim."). 65 Id. at 508. As they elaborate: "Because the criminal offender controls, to a large extent, both her conduct and her mental state, the [WC] paradigm confers upon the criminal offender the power to dictate the content of criminal prohibitions and the sanctions imposed for violating them." This is a strange characterization of how crimes occur-as if a criminal offender chooses her state of mind (intention, knowledge, reckless, or negligence) off a mental rack. In any event, to a retributivist, focusing on the actor's chosen conduct and on the mental state he exhibits in so acting is no more a "bias" in favor of the actor than focusing on the harm to a tort victim is a "bias" in favor of that victim. If the distinctive rationale for criminal punishment should be just deserts, then we must focus on the actor; just as we must focus on harm to a tort victim if the distinctive rationale for tort compensation is corrective justice. In either case, of course, if the legal institution of punishment or liability has no distinctive rationale but is merely one ; with endorsing a larger punishment cog in a larger consequentialist machine, then it would follow that any use of the cog that does not optimize the desired consequences is "biased." 66 For example, in Alabama, bias motivation increases the minimum penalty for Class A felonies from 10 to 15 years imprisonment, and for Class B felonies from 2 to 10 years.
Ala. St. § § 13A-5-6, 13A-5-13 (1997) . In many states, bias motivation increases the authorized punishment for a crime by one degree-for example, increasing a Class B felony to a class A, or a second degree misdemeanor to first degree. See, e.g., Fla. St.
Ann. §775.085 (1998); Neb. Rev. St. §28-111 (1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2927.12 (1998). The effect of such a category increase is often a substantial increase in the maximum punishment permitted, if not the minimum punishment required. For example, in Florida, any felony of the second degree that is based on prejudice is punishable as a felony of the first degree; thus, the authorized maximum penalty increases from 15 years imprisonment to 30. And the punishment for any third degree felony based on prejudice can increase from a maximum of 5 years to the 15 years authorized for a second degree felony. Fla. St. Ann. §775.082.
In Apprendi v. New York, 120 S. Ct. 2348 Ct. (2000 , the Supreme Court recently struck down as unconstitutional a New Jersey statutory scheme that permits an increase in the maximum penalty for a "second-degree" offense from 10 to 20 years based on a judge's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant acted with a purpose to intimidate because of race or other prohibited criteria. The specific constitutional defect was the state's failure to require that the aggravating fact be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. If such a requirement were in place, however, it is very likely that the penalty enhancement would be constitutional. For the Court has
